Research Interests

• Microeconomic Theory, Industrial Organization, Mechanism Design

Education

• Ph.D. in Economics, UCLA, 2016;

• M.A. in Economics, UCLA, 2011;

• B.A. in Economics and Finance, The University of Hong Kong, 2010

Teaching

• Advanced Microeconomics (1st year Ph.D./Master)

• Microeconomics (Freshman/Sophomore)

Publications

• Search frictions in many-to-one markets, Journal of Industrial Economics, forthcoming.

• Prioritized organ donation allocation rules under compatibility constraints, with Mengling Li and Yohanes E. Riyanto, Games and Economic Behavior 141 (2023): 403-427.

• Remedying adverse selection in donor-priority rule using freeze period: theory and experiment, with Mengling Li and Yohanes E. Riyanto, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 194 (2022): 384-407.

• Organ donation with vouchers, with Jaehong Kim and Mengling Li, Journal of Economic Theory 191 (2021): 105159.

Working Papers

• Priority search with outside options, with Jaehong Kim and Mengling Li, Theoretical Economics, revise and resubmit.

• Non-linear pricing with reneging, with Yujing Xu.

• Monopolistic screening with limited enforcement.

Research Grants (as PI)

• National Natural Science Foundation of China

  Market failures and mechanism design in platform economy (2024-2027)

• Humanities and Social Sciences Research of the Ministry of Education

  Dynamic game and contract theory in platform economics (2021-2023)

• National Natural Science Foundation of China Youth Program

  Dynamic game and contract theory in shadow banking and microfinance (2018-2020)